Abstract: This paper examines the impact of stock liquidity on firm bankruptcy risk. Using the Securities and Exchange Commission's decimalization regulation as a shock to stock liquidity, we establish that enhanced liquidity decreases default risk. Stocks with the highest default risk experience the largest improvements. We find two mechanisms through which stock liquidity reduces firm default risk: through improving stock price informational efficiency and facilitating corporate governance by blockholders. Of the two mechanisms, the informational efficiency channel has higher explanatory power than the corporate governance channel.
Introduction
Default is among the most abrasive events in the life of a corporation. It causes disruptions in productivity through supply chain interruptions and employee attrition, incurs lawyer and administrative costs, and harms customer retention. Default occurs when a firm's cash flows are insufficient to cover its debt service costs and principal payments. Default risk increases when a firm's average cash flow level shifts down and/or its cash flow volatility increases. A liquid market provides investors the ability to trade stocks quickly and with minimal cost. Can liquidity help predict the likelihood of default? Can liquidity affect the risk of default? This paper studies the effect of stock liquidity on default risk.
Stock liquidity may impact default risk for a number of reasons. Increasing liquidity may increase default risk if it exacerbates noise trading, leading to greater firm mispricing and higher volatility (Goldstein and Guembel, 2008; Baker, Stein, and Wurgler, 2003; Polk and Sapienza, 2009; Ozdenoren and Yuan, 2008) . Greater liquidity may also decrease internal firm monitoring (Bhide, 1993) . Alternatively, higher liquidity could decrease default risk by improving price efficiency or improving corporate governance through easing investors' ability to exit. Fang, Noe, and Tice (2009) provide empirical evidence that liquidity increases firm value. Even so, the effect of stock liquidity on default risk is not mechanical as default risk can be non-linear and depends on several factors other than firm value.
Understanding the general empirical relation between liquidity and default risk is valuable. Liquidity as a predictor variable may help improve models measuring a firm's default risk. Having a real-time publicly observable signal to improve default risk models can lead to better contracting and risk management by suppliers, customers, and counterparties.
To capture default risk we use Bharath and Shumway (2008) 's measure of expected default frequency (EDF). The EDF is a simplified version of Merton (1974)'s structural distanceto-default model. Researchers could examine bankruptcy events directly, but as bankruptcies are rare estimation techniques are difficult to implement in practice. Instead, models of default likelihood give cross sectional and time varying probabilities of default. Bharath and Shumway (2008) show that EDF does surprisingly well at forecasting bankruptcies out of sample. The measure uses the same inputs as Merton's distance to default model and keeps the same functional form, but foregoes the iterative solution procedure.
With the EDF measure as our measure of default risk, we evaluate the U.S. equity market between 1994 and 2014. 1 Overall, there is a negative relation between default risk and liquidity.
A one standard deviation increase in liquidity measured by relative effective spread (Effective Spread) is associated with a drop of 26.89% over the sample mean of EDF.
While we are interested in whether liquidity affects default risk, it is also possible for default risk to affect liquidity. For instance, bid-ask spreads may widen as a firm approaches default and its stock becomes more volatile. To overcome reverse causality concerns we implement a difference-in-difference analysis around the 2001 decimalization event. In 2001 the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) reduced the minimum tick size from a sixteenth of a dollar to a hundredth of a dollar. Prior studies show that decimalization improves market liquidity significantly, especially among actively traded stocks (Goldstein and Kavajecz, 2000; Bessembinder, 2003) .
The effect is large, with EDF decreasing by 6.2% for the treatment group around decimalization. Separating stocks into quintiles based on pre-decimalization EDF shows that it is stocks with the highest default risk that are most affected. The riskiest quantile experience a decline in EDF of 14.64%.
We rule out that the effect is mechanical. The event study shows higher stock liquidity decreases default risk. We show the effect is not mechanical via increased firm value as a result of higher liquidity. On the contrary, the liquidity effect is more pronounced among firms experiencing a drop in firm value. Specifically, the impact of an exogenous shock to liquidity on EDF is largest for firms where Ln(Equity) falls, or Ln(Debt) increases.
Finally, we study two possible channels that may be driving the relation between liquidity and default risk: information efficiency, and governance. Higher information efficiency can improve firm performance. Higher liquidity permits informed investors to profit more from their private information, thus incentivizing investors to acquire more information and trade on it, leading to more informed stock prices (Holden and Subrahmanyam, 1992; Holmströ m and Tirole, 1993; Subrahmanyam and Titman, 2001) . Managers learn from stock prices and use it to guide corporate investments (Luo, 2005; Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang, 2007; Bakke and Whited, 2010) . Consequently, managers make better investment decisions, generate higher cash flows, and reduce cash flow volatility, resulting in lower default risk. We return to examining the decimalization event. We perform the difference-in-difference analysis by subtracting the control group values from the treatment group, and focus on the changes in price efficiency after decimalization. Price efficiency is captured using stock return correlation or Hou and Moskowitz (2005)'s price delay measure. We find that stocks with the largest improvement in information efficiency experience the greatest reduction in default risk.
The second mechanism we explore is governance. Higher liquidity makes it easier for blockholders to sell stocks. Ex-ante, the threat of exit can serve as an effective corporate governance mechanism (Admati and Pfleiderer, 2009; Edmans, 2009; Edmans and Manso, 2011) . Good corporate governance disciplines managers. It urges them to engage in valueenhancing investments and guards against opportunistic management behavior, potentially leading to lower default probability. Using the same methodology as was used to investigate information efficiency we empirically examine the corporate governance mechanism. We capture corporate governance by examining the number of shareholders holding greater than 5% of shares (blockholders) and using the fraction of shares held by these blockholders. Firms with a greater increase in governance monitoring have a larger decrease in default risk.
While the data show the mechanisms driving the results include improving price efficiency and improving blockholder corporate governance, the price efficiency channel has higher explanatory power than the corporate governance channel. A one standard deviation improvement in price efficiency is associated with about an 11% increase in the standard deviation of the change of EDF.
This paper contributes to the growing literature showing that secondary markets have implications for firms, specifically that liquidity can have real effects (Bond, Edmans, and Goldstein, 2012 Fang, and Zur (2013) show that greater stock liquidity results in governance shifting from blockholder's voice to the threat of exit. Fang, Tian, and Tice (2014) find that an increase in liquidity leads to decrease in firm innovation. Norli, Ostergaard, and Schindele (2015) show that greater stock liquidity can increase shareholder activism.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and variable construction. Section 3 presents the general empirical results. Section 4 evaluates causality. Section 5 examines the possible mechanisms. Section 6 concludes.
Data and variable construction
The sample construction starts with a comprehensive list of U.S. common stocks between 1993 and 2013 2 , which appears in both the Compustat Industrial file and the Center for
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Research in Security Prices (CRSP) stock file. We obtain intraday trades and quotes from the Trade and Quote (TAQ) database to construct the high-frequency liquidity measure. We exclude from our sample financial firms (SIC codes between 6000 and 6999) because their accounting numbers are subject to statutory capital requirements. To ensure there are enough data points to compute liquidity measures we exclude firm-year observations with less than 200 active trading days in a year. The accounting data are obtained from the CRSP/Compustat merged quarterly database. If the accounting information is missing for one year, the previous nonmissing observation is used. The final sample contains 7,128 firms and 51,527 firm-year observations.
All variable definitions are in Table 1 .
Insert Table 1 About Here
We capture stock liquidity using both high-frequency and low-frequency measures. We consider two spread measures calculated using data from the TAQ database. Compared to variables based on daily data, high-frequency measures provide a better and more precise measure of trading cost (Goyenko, Holden, and Trzcinka, 2009 ). Our main liquidity measure is relative effective spread (Effective Spread), which captures the cost of a round-trip trade. The relative effective spread is defined as twice the difference between the execution price and the midpoint of the prevailing best quotes divided by the midpoint of the prevailing best bid-ask quote. We multiply the value by 100 so the variable is in percentages.
We apply several filters to the TAQ data before computing the effective spread measures.
We follow Hasbrouck (2010) to derive the National Best Bid and Offer (NBBO) 3 and then match each trade to a prevailing national best bid-ask quote. 4 Following Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2001) we exclude records for which the bid-ask spread is larger than $5, the dollar effective spread is more than four times larger than the dollar quoted spread, the relative effective spread is four times larger than the relative quoted spread, and where the bid-ask spread is more than 40% of the trade price. We classify trades into buyer-initiated and sellerinitiated using the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm.
The daily relative effective spread is the equal-weighted average of all intraday effective spread records. We then average across all trading days in a year to compute Effective Spread . A high spread implies low liquidity.
The second liquidity measure is percentage quoted spread (Quoted Spread), defined as the difference between the national best ask and bid price divided by the midpoint of the best bid and ask price. The value is multiplied by 100 so the variable is in percentages. We first compute the daily equal-weighted average of all intraday relative quoted spread and then average across all trading days in a year to obtain Quoted Spread.
Our first low-frequency measure is the Amihud illiquidity ratio (2002), Amihud, defined as the absolute value of daily stock return divided by daily dollar trading volume, multiplied by 10 6 . The measure captures the idea that, for a given amount of trading, illiquid stocks should experience a larger change price. A higher Amihud value corresponds to lower liquidity.
Following Lesmond, Ogden, and Trzcinka (1999) , the measure Zeros is defined as the proportion of days with zero returns, multiplied by 100. Illiquid stocks are more likely to experience trading days with zero returns due to either no trading interest or high trading cost.
A higher Zeros value represents lower liquidity.
8
We construct a measure of expected default frequency (EDF) as in Bharath and Shumway (2008) , which is a simplified version of Merton (1974)'s structural distance-to-default model. Merton (1974) considers a firm's equity a call option on the underlying value of the firm's assets with a strike price equal to the face value of the firm's debt, and a firm defaults when its asset value falls below the face value of the firm's debt. The model calculates a distant-to-default (DD) measure. The resulting DD measure is then substituted in to a cumulative standard normal distribution to compute the probability that the value of firm's assets will be less than the face value of its debt.
While the Merton model has been widely used in academic studies and by practitioners (Crosbie and Bohn, 2003; Kealhofer and Kurbat, 2001; Vassalou and Xing, 2004; Duffie, Saita, and Wang, 2007) Bharath and Shumway (2008) argue that Merton model's predictive power mainly comes from its functional form, rather than the actual default probability produced by the model. Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008) reach a similar conclusion. Bharath and Shumway (2008) further propose a naï ve default probability measure which retains the Merton model's structural form and same basic inputs while simplifying the calculation. They show that the naï ve measure performs well. We follow Bharath and Shumway (2008) We use the same control variables as Bharath and Shumway (2008) . Ln(Equity) is the natural log of market value of equity at the end of the year. Ln(Debt) is the natural log of face value of debt. 1/σ E is the inverse of the annualized stock return volatility. Excess Return, is the difference between the stock's annual return and the CRSP value-weighted return. We follow Bharath and Shumway (2008) to calculate the excess return using market return as the benchmark given our focus on the part of return that is not explained by the overall market return. 5 Income/Assets is the ratio of net income to total asset. We winsorize all variables, except EDF, at the 1st and 99th percentile to mitigate the influences of outliers. Table 2 reports summary statistics, including the mean, minimum, median, maximum, and standard deviation, for the entire sample.
Insert Table 2 About Here
Panel A reports the variables used for the full sample. Panel B reports only the variables used for the mechanism analysis in Section 5. We discuss Panel B in Section 5.
5 We repeat the analysis with raw returns and the results are qualitatively the same.
For the full period the summary statistics show the range of our sample. An average firm in our sample has an expected default probability (EDF) of 6.19%. The default rate is highly skewed right. While the median is zero, the maximum is a full 100%. 6 The standard deviation of 
Univariate analysis
We form portfolios by sorting stocks by their level of liquidity. Specifically, in each year t, stocks are assigned into one of five groups based on their liquidity measure. We compute the portfolio EDF in year t+1 by taking the average of the EDF across all stocks in the portfolio. These results establish a negative relation between stock liquidity and default risk at the univariate level. However, some of the difference in default risk might be due to other firm characteristics. For instance, small firms may be riskier and have a higher default risk. These small firms are also more likely to have low stock liquidity due to greater information asymmetry. We next conduct multivariate analysis, along with quasi-natural experiments to control for possible confounding effects.
Multivariate analyses
We extend the analysis to a multivariate setting. Bharath and Shumway (2008) 
where Liquidity is either Effective Spread, Quoted Spread, Amihud, or Zeros measured for firm i in year t-1; Firm and Year stand for vectors of firm and year fixed effects. Table 4 presents the results from the EDF regression analysis with firm and year fixed effects.
Insert Table 4 About Here
Column (1) presents the results of the regression without a liquidity measure. Columns (2) to (5) reports The results from the multivariate regression analysis support the comparative statics in the previous section. The negative relation between liquidity and default risk persists even after controlling for firm characteristics known to be associated with default risk.
One potential concern is that the relation shown in Table 4 Panel A is driven by one or a handful of industries. For instance, given the large number of bankruptcies following the dotcom bubble it may be that our results are limited to high-tech firms. To address this concern, we estimate the EDF regression separately for each of the Fama-French 12 industries. As we exclude financial firms, there are only 11 industries in the sample.
14 Panel B of Table 4 reports the results. Each row represents a regression conducted for a particular industry sub-set of firms. For instance, Row (1) is based on firms in the Non-durables industry. For each industry we perform four regressions, one for each of the liquidity measures.
For brevity, we only report the coefficient and standard error, clustered by firm, for the liquidity variable from the regression. Not every coefficient is statistically significant, but overall the negative relation between liquidity and default risk hold across industries. For Quoted Spread it is statistically significant for all 11 industries. For Effective Spread (Amihud and Zeros), 10 (6 and 5) of the 11 industries show a statistically significant coefficient. The effects of liquidity on default risk are not purely driven by high-tech industries, but can also be found in widespread across the economy.
Exogeneity
The previous section shows a relation between liquidity and default risk. However, multivariate analysis does not address the potential reverse causality problem. Empirically, it is difficult to identify whether higher stock liquidity leads to lower default risk because the relation goes both ways. Liquidity may affect default risk but default risk could also affect liquidity.
Market makers will demand higher returns for making markets in riskier assets by quoting wider spreads (Copeland and Galai, 1983) . That is, market makers will provide less liquidity in stocks with higher default risk. Even lagging independent variables is not sufficient to overcome the reverse causality problem. The identification strategy we implement to address the issue is to use tick price decimalization as an exogenous shock to stock liquidity, and conduct several tests including difference-in-difference tests to identify the effect of liquidity on default probability in the following session. Decimalization is widely used in prior literature as an exogenous positive shock to stock market liquidity (Fang, Noe, and Tice, 2009; Bharath, Jayaraman, and Nagar, 2013; Kang and Kim, 2013; Edmans, Fang, and Zur, 2013) . It is a good candidate for an exogenous shock to liquidity for three reasons. First, the event is unlikely to be driven by firm default risk. Instead the change was prompted by the SEC's effort to reduce security trading cost, encourage quote competition, and boost the US equity market's competitive edge relative to foreign markets. 11
Second, stock liquidity improved significantly after decimalization, especially among actively traded stocks (Bessembinder, 2003; Furfine, 2003; Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam, 2008) .
Third, there is large cross-sectional variation in the change in liquidity, allowing us to implement a difference-in-difference analysis to test whether a larger increase in liquidity is associated with a greater decline in default risk.
We focus on the year before and the year after decimalization. A short window reduces concerns relating to reverse causality, and allows us to better control for the impact of unobserved variables since significant changes in those variables are less likely to happen during a short window.
To make claims about how liquidity affects default risk, we employ a difference-indifference (DiD) identification strategy. We compare the change in the default probability for two groups of firms that look similar except that they experience a significantly different change in liquidity around decimalization. The DiD method controls for the impact of omitted and unobserved variables, and removes biases driven by time trends.
We follow Fang, Tian, and Tice (2014) to construct a treatment group and a control group using propensity score matching. Specifically, we rank all sample firms based on their changes in liquidity around decimalization and assign them into terciles, and retain firms in the first and third tercile. From here onwards in this paper, we focus on the relative effective spread,
We estimate a probit model in which the dependent variable is set to one for firms in the first tercile and zero for firms in the third tercile, and use the predicted probabilities (propensity scores) to match firms in the two groups. The probit model includes Effective Spread and the same set of control variables as in Equation (4), measured in the pre-decimalization year (2000) . Each firm in the first tercile is matched to a firm in the third tercile with the closest propensity score and that has a propensity score match within 0.01. We retain all pairs in the case of multiple matching. This approach yields a treatment group and a matching control group with firms having very similar firm characteristics and liquidity prior to decimalization but experiencing different degree of change in liquidity after decimalization. The treatment (control) group consists of firms with the highest (lowest) increase in stock liquidity decimalization.
The matching procedure produces 700 12 treatment-control pairs. The results of the probit regression are reported in Table 5 , Panel A, in Column (1).
Insert Table 5 About Here
The probit model produces a pseudo R-square of 0.1068 and a p-value from the chi-square test below 0.0001, suggesting that the model specification captures a significant amount of variation in the choice variable.
The validity of the DiD estimator critically depends on the assumption that the underlying trends in the outcome variable is the same for both groups (parallel trend assumption). We follow Fang, Tian, and Tice (2014) and perform three diagnostic tests to verify that the assumption holds in this case.
The first diagnose test re-runs the probit model reported in Table 5 , Panel A Column (1), but for the matched sample, and present the results in Column (2) of Table 5 Panel A. All of the explanatory variables are insignificant and the likelihood ratio is lower than pre-match probit model results in Column (1). The interpretation is that there are no observable different characteristics between the treatment and control groups in the pre-decimalization year. The magnitude of the coefficient estimates in the post-match analysis are smaller, and no longer statistically significant, compared to that of the coefficients in the pre-match analysis suggesting a weaker relation between firm characteristic differentials between the treatment and control group. In addition, the pseudo R-square drops drastically from 0.1068 prior to the matching to 0.0016. The chi-square test has a p-value of 0.9556 on the pre-match probit model suggesting that overall all coefficient estimates on independent variables are not statistically significantly different from zero.
The analysis in Table 5 , Panel A Column (2) dampens the concern that the less-affected control group is not fundamentally different from the more-affected treatment group. However, it is always possible there is an omitted variable that is correlated with both how decimalization affected different stocks, and EDF. Therefore, complete exogeneity is challenging to establish.
In the ideal setting there would be a group of stocks that were not subject to the tick size change that we could use as a control group. Prior to the 2001 decimalization there was a short pilot program that had a staggered introduction and so created a natural unaffected control group.
While the time period is short, we show in the internet appendix that the main results in this paper hold in the pilot program.
The second test compares the propensity scores of the treatment and control groups. Table 5 Panel B reports the distribution of the propensity scores for both groups and their difference. The two groups' propensity scores line up closely. The average distance between the treatment firms' and matching control firms' propensity score is less than -0.0001, with a maximum (minimum) of 0 (-0.0092).
The last diagnostic test performs a t-test on the differences between the two groups' predecimalization characteristics. Panel C of Table 5 shows there are no statistically significant differences between the treatment and control group of firms' characteristics that affect firm's EDF. Moreover, the two groups have similar level of liquidity prior to decimalization, even if the decimalization affects them differently. The above diagnostic tests suggest the propensity score matching method is able to dampen the potentially confounding firm differences known to affect default risk, helping to alleviate concerns the results are not driven by general time trends.
Panel D of Table 5 shows that there are significant differences in EDF between the treatment and control firms after decimalization. We calculate the DiD estimator and corresponding t-statistics and report the results in Table 5 , Panel E. Specifically, we calculate the change of EDF from the pre-decimalization year to the post-decimalization year (∆EDF) for both the treatment and control firms. We next examine the difference in ∆EDF between the two groups. On average, a treatment group firm experiences a larger decline in default risk by 8.97%
compared to a control group firm. The difference is statistically significant at the 1% level.
Finally, we perform the DiD analysis in a regression framework as follows:
where Treatment is a dummy variable equal to one (zero) if a stock is part of the treatment (control) group; After is a dummy variable equal to one for 2002 (post-decimalization year) and zero for 2000; Treatment*After is the interaction between these two variables.
The control variables are the same as those used in the probit model in Table 5 The results are in Table 5 , Panel F. The statistical significant and negative coefficients of -0.062 for Treatment*After indicates that the treatment firms experience a larger drop of 6.2%
in EDF after the decimalization compared to the control group. The results consistently show that an increase in liquidity lowers EDF. 13, 14 If stock liquidity can reduce the risk of default, the effect should be largest as a firm nears default. To test this conjecture we divide the matched sample into four groups based on the size of the pre-decimalization EDF and run the DiD regression from Equation (5) for each group separately. Table 6 reports the results.
Insert Table 6 About Here
Column (1) 
Possible mechanisms
In this section, we investigate possible explanations for why liquidity may reduce default risk. We first provide further evidence that the linkage is not mechanism. Thereafter, we explore two possible channels through which stock liquidity affects firm default risk: information efficiency and governance. We find evidence of both channels at work. In a horse race we show the informational efficiency channel plays a larger role.
Is the relation between liquidity and default risk mechanical?
Default occurs when a firm is unable to meet its debt obligations or when its asset value falls below the debt value. Fang, Noe, and Tice (2009) provide evidence that, compared to their low liquidity counterparties, firms with liquid stocks tend to have higher firm value, leading to lower likelihood of bankruptcy. It may be that the negative relation between liquidity and default probability is simply a direct result of the firm value effect. To address a mechanical relationship between firm value increasing and therefore default risk decreasing we already include as a control variable in the Equation (5) specification the change in Tobin's Q.
To more closely examine the role of firm value in our results we re-estimate the DiD regression in Equation (5) for subsamples of firms with different changes in firm value around decimalization. Specifically, we divide the matched sample into two subsamples based on the direction of the change of equity value or debt value around decimalization. If the low default risk is mechanically driven by higher firm value, we expect to see the relation more pronounced among firms with positive (negative) change in equity (debt) value. The results are reported in Table 7 .
Insert Table 7 About Here
Column (1) includes only the matched sample of firms with a zero or negative change of Ln(Equity). In Column (2) the sample includes only firms with positive change of Ln(Equity).
The coefficient on Treatment*After is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level in Column (1), while it is statistically insignificant in Column (2). We calculate a Z-statistic to formally test whether the coefficient on Treatment*After is different between the analysis in Column (1) and (2). The Z-statistic shows the two coefficients are statistically significantly different from each other. The differential coefficient indicates that the effect of liquidity on EDF is more pronounced for firms with negative change of equity value. This is counter to the direct effect that would suggest the effect should be larger when Ln(Equity) increases. investors may possess better information on other price relevant factors such as the macroeconomic and industry outlook, and competitors' strategies, which is transmitted into stock prices through their trading. Managers tend to 'listen' to the information from the financial market since it is accessible and cheap (Dow and Gorton, 1997). As a result, managers use the information in stock prices to guide their decision making and investments (Luo, 2005; Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang, 2007; Bakke and Whited, 2010) , which, in turn, affects a firm's future cash flow and its ability to meet its debt obligation.
15 In unreported results, we do the analysis for two inputs of EDF, Return and σ E . For the Return input, the largest magnitude decrease is associated with a positive change of stock return as the direct static effect would suggest. For σ E , the coefficient on Treatment*After is only statistically significant for firms with increasing σ E , which is associated with the opposite effect expected from the positive relation between σ E and EDF. The results suggest the relation between liquidity and EDF is complex and the effect of liquidity on any one input variable does not mechanically determine the overall effect.
We employ two measures to capture price efficiency. The first measure is stock return autocorrelation (Correlation), the absolute value of the first-order return autocorrelation of weekly returns. A smaller autocorrelation indicates that the stock price process is closer to a random walk and thus the price is more efficient. The second measure is price delay measure + , , where r i,t is the return on stock i in week t, R m,t is the return on the CRSP value-weighted market index in week t. The restricted model restricts that (− ) = 0. We compute the price efficiency measures for each stock for the pre-and post-decimalization year, and take the difference to obtain the change in price efficiency measure from pre-decimalization year to post-decimalization year (∆Correlation and ∆Price Delay). Table 8 , Panel A reports the statistics and the corresponding t-statistics.
Insert Table 8 About Here
Compared to the control firms, after decimalization, firms in the treatment group experience a statistically significant larger drop of 2.92% and 6.25% in Correlation and Price Delay, respectively. The results are consistent with firms experiencing an increase in price efficiency due to higher liquidity decreasing default risk.
In the regression specification we regress ∆EDF on the change in a price efficiency measure and the change of control variables for the matched sample constructed in Table 5 . 16 The change is from pre-decimalization year (2000) to post-decimalization year (2002) compared to firms in the control group. The magnitude varies across the two price efficiency measures, but all suggest that the informational efficiency of price is a channel through which stock liquidity affects firm's default risk.
Corporate governance
Another possible channel through which stock liquidity reduces default risk is corporate governance. Maug (1998) (2011) show liquidity increases blockholders' effectiveness in exerting corporate governance through disciplinary trading, which, as a result, induces a higher managerial effort.
Edmans, Fang, and Zur (2013) document the causal effect of liquidity on improving corporate governance using decimalization as an exogenous shock. Specifically, they show that liquidity 17 Multiply the coefficient on ∆Correlation by the difference-in-difference estimator of ∆Correlation.
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facilitates block formation and encourages governing via trading ('exit'), although liquidity weakens blockholders' incentives for active intervention ('voice'). The overall effect is positive.
We employ two measures to capture governance, blockholder ownership (Block) and the number of blockholders (NBlock) using institutional ownership data from the Thomson-Reuters Institutional (13F) Holdings database at WRDS. Block is calculated as the total holding by institutional blockholders who own no less than 5% of the shares outstanding at the end of each year, while NBlock is the number of the blockholders (Larcker, Richardson, and Tuna, 2007; Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007) .
Similar to the analysis in Section 5.2, we first show that the shock to liquidity brought by decimalization is associated with more block holding in terms of the number of blockholders and their total holding. Specifically, ∆Block is defined as the difference in total block holding between pre-event and post-event period. ∆NBlock is defined in similar manner. Table 9 , Panel A shows the difference-in-difference estimators for both ∆Block and ∆NBlock.
Insert Table 9 About Here
Blockholders as a group increase their holdings in treatment firms from 16.56% to 17.93% of shares outstanding following the change to trading in decimalization, compared to change from 16.03% to 14.26% for control firms. The DiD is 3.14 percentage points, statistically significant at the 1% level. Results are qualitatively similar for the number of blockholders. The number blockholders in the treatment stocks increase by 0.34 more compared to the control stocks, with a p-value less than 0.0001. Taken together, these results suggest that an improvement in liquidity attracts more blockholders and results in a subsequent increase in their aggregate ownership.
We next regress ∆EDF on the change in the blockholding measure and the change of control variables. The results are reported in Panel B of Table 9 . Column (1) includes Block, while Column (2) includes NBlock. The coefficient of the change in Block (NBlock) is -0.1617 (-0.0079), suggesting that, compared to the control firms, an average firm in the treatment group that experiences a larger increase of 3.14% (34%) in Block (NBlock) surrounding the decimalization can lead to a further reduction of EDF by 0.51% (0.27%). 18 The treatment stocks experience an additional drop in EDF of 0.51% due to increased blockholding, which is equivalent to a decline of 3.08% over their pre-decimalization mean. Results for the number of blockholders are similar in terms of sign and the magnitude of the effects. The results suggest that improved corporate governance is a channel through which stock liquidity affects firm's default risk.
One concern regarding the governance channel is that the effective spread is not directly relevant to block formation and blockholder trading. To address this concern, we repeat the analysis by replacing the effective spread with a price impact measure. 19 Price impact is a measure of liquidity that focuses on how a trade (buy or sell) affects the subsequent price change.
It reflects the cost faced by traders, making it a relevant measure for large traders such as blockholders. We follow Bessembinder and Kaufman (1997) to calculate the price impact component of the relative effective spread. 20 We first construct the matched sample based on the change of Price Impact surrounding the Decimalization, and show that the shock to price impact brought by decimalization is associated with more block holding. The results in Table 9 Panels C and D still support the corporate governance channel.
Comparing mechanisms
18 Multiply the coefficient on ∆Block (∆NBlock) by the difference-in-difference estimator of ∆Block (∆NBlock), -0.1617*0.0314 (-0.0079*0.34). 19 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting the idea. 20 See Table 1 for the calculation of Price Impact.
While the data show that both increasing price efficiency and improving corporate governance drive the results, it is unclear which mechanism is more important. We compare the two mechanisms through a horse race. We include measures for the two mechanisms in one regression specification. As there are different measures for each mechanism and these measures have divergent magnitudes, we use different combinations of the measures and implement a standardized regression. We subtract the dependent variable and all independent variables by their mean value and divide the difference by their standard deviation. For instance, we standardize ΔEDF by subtracting its mean value and dividing the difference by the standard deviation of ΔEDF. The interpretation of a coefficient is the impact a one-standard deviation change in the independent variable has on the dependent variable, in terms of a standard deviation variation.
We again use the matched sample constructed in suggesting that the explanatory power of the blockholders' governance channel is lower than that of the price efficiency channel.
Conclusion
This study examines whether and how stock liquidity affects firm default risk, as measured by expected default frequency (EDF). We show a strong negative relation between stock liquidity and firm bankruptcy risk. The relation is robust across multiple liquidity measures. To overcome reverse causality concerns, we use the decimalization event of 2001 as an exogenous shock to stock liquidity and employ a difference-in-difference analysis to show a negative effect of stock liquidity on firm default risk. The results consistently show that increasing stock liquidity decreases firm default risk. Moreover, the relation appears non-linear.
The impact is higher for firms with greater default risk in the pre-decimalization period.
The paper further explores the underlying mechanism through which stock liquidity affects default risk. We provide support that increased price efficiency and improved corporate governance. A horse race between the mechanisms shows that the informational efficiency channel is more important than the governance channel.
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Prior work shows a positive link between liquidity and firm value. Firms with higher firm value are less likely to miss their debt obligation, leading to a concern that the negative relation between liquidity and default probability is mechanical via increased firm value. We show that, even after controlling for the firm value channel, increasing stock liquidity reduces default risk.
Default is costly for the firm, its investors, and the real economy. Annual relative effective spread. Relative effective spread is twice the difference between the execution price and the midpoint of the prevailing best bid-ask quote divided by the midpoint of the prevailing best bid-ask quote, multiplied by 100, and measured over one year;
Quoted Spread
Annual relative quoted spread multiplied by 100. Relative quoted spread is the best bidask spread divided by the midpoint of the best bid-ask quote. Measured over one year; + , , where r i,t is the return on stock i in week t, R m,t is the return on CRSP value-weighted market index in week t. The restricted model restricting that δ (-n) =0;
Price Impact
The price impact component of the relative effective spread. It is measured as Price Impact it = 100 LR it (Pi t+n − M it ) /M it where Pi t+n denotes the first trade price observed at least 30 minutes after the trade for which price impact is measured, M it is the midpoint of the matched prevailing best bid-ask quote, and LR it is an indicator variable that equals one for buyer-initiated trade and negative one for seller-initiated trade.
Block
Aggregate percentage ownership of blockholders who hold at least 5% of total common shares outstanding at the end of year;
NBlock
The number of block owners who hold at least 5% of total common shares outstanding at the end of year;
Tobin's Q
The Market value of assets over book value of assets calculated from Compustat: (ATQ-CEQQ+CSHOQ*PRCCQ)/ATQ where ATQ is total asset (Compustat quarterly data #44), CEQQ is total common equity (Compustat quarterly data #59), CSHOQ is common shares outstanding (Compustat quarterly data #61), and PRCCQ is stock price at the end of the quarter. Panel A presents a difference-in-difference test on how changes in Effective Spread surrounding the decimalization year affect the blockholder ownership and the number of blockholders. Blockholder ownership (BLOCK) is calculated by aggregating institutional blockholders percentage which is above 5% of total common shares outstanding at the end of year. The number of blockholders (NBLOCK) is the number of block owners who hold at least 5% of total common shares outstanding at the end of year. The difference-in-difference test is based on the matched sample used in Table 5 . Panel C reports the OLS regression results with ΔEDF as dependent variable based on the matched sample constructed in Table 5 . Δ presents the change of variables from 2000 (prior to decimalization) to 2002 (after decimalization). Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicates statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Panels C and D repeat the analysis using Price Impact as the dependent variable (See Table 1 for definitions of Price Impact). 
